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Abstract  
 
Many computable general equilibrium models have been set up recently, in order to assess the benefits of trade 
liberalisation, especially in agriculture. Although figures magnitudes differ from one model to another, they 
cannot reach any other conclusion than positive benefits. On the other hand, historical experience shows that 
liberalisation, far from being a new idea,  has been tried at several occasions during the two last centuries, 
repeatedly ending in crisis, and hasty return to various forms of protection. A possible explanation could be in 
the comparative static approach of most liberalisation proponents, and their neglect of dynamic aspects. 
Especially, because risk is necessarily tied with unfulfilled expectations, it should play a decisive role in 
modelling. A new model is developed along this line, showing the possibility of a chaotic price regime, which 
would prevent full liberalisation to be feasible.  
 
Resumen 
 
Muchos general equilibrio computables modelos se han instalado recientemente, para determinar las 
ventajas de la liberalización comercial, especialmente en agricultura. Aunque las figuras magnitudes 
diferencian de un modelo a otro, no pueden alcanzar ninguna otra conclusión que ventajas positivas. 
Por otra parte, la experiencia histórica demuestra que la liberalización, lejos de ser una nueva idea, se 
ha intentado en varias ocasiones durante los dos siglos pasados, terminando en crisis, y vuelta 
precipitada a las varias formas de protección. Una explicación posible podría estar en el acercamiento 
de estático comparativo de la mayoría de los autores de la liberalización, y su negligencia de aspectos 
dinámicos. Especialmente, porque el riesgo se ata necesariamente con expectativas incumplidas, 
debe desempeñar un papel decisivo en modelar. Un nuevo modelo se desarrolla a lo largo de esta 
línea, demostrando la posibilidad de un régimen caótico del precio, que prevendría la liberalización 
completa para ser factible. 
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Consequences of price volatility in evaluating the benefits 
of liberalisation 
 
Since the very beginning of economic science, the potential benefits from trade are well 
known. Although he was not the first to put shame on trade impeding laws, David Ricardo 
cast the most famous argument in favour of trade with his parabola about the Portuguese wine 
and the English cloth. After him, the benefits from trade, and the importance of dismantling 
trade barriers are universally acknowledged among economists.   
 
Real life, nevertheless, contradicts this unanimity. Trade barriers have been effective in most 
countries during the 19th and the 20th century. This is not by chance: at regular intervals, 
economists persuaded decision-makers and citizen that “trade barriers were bad”. They were 
removed several time during the period, and re-established afterward ( be it under the form of 
tariff, or any other bureaucratic obstacle to free trade). There should be serious reasons for 
that…  
 
At present, since the early 1980’s, trade barriers are low, in general, and they are lowered 
each year. Agriculture is somewhat an exception in this respect: although variable according 
to commodity and country, trade barriers are still high in agriculture. It was precisely a major 
purpose of the Doha round to lower these “abnormal” trade barriers in agriculture, supposedly 
preventing development. In addition, there were all the reasons to liberalise agriculture, 
because, in agriculture, the comparative advantage theory should apply even more than 
elsewhere : one may wonder why producing computers in Hong Kong is better than in New 
York, while producing wine is obviously easier in Portugal than in Scandinavia1.  
 
And yet, contrary to all expectations, the Doha round seems to end, if not with a total failure, 
at least, with very modest results. Again, there are here deeper reasons than the mere egoism 
of a few nations or lobbies, so powerful as they may be. 
 
In this paper, possible explanations for this situation will be sought for. They can be found in 
the shortcoming of the models which are at the origin of the creed according to which “trade 
barriers are bad”. It will be demonstrated that, although trade is almost always “good”, the 
necessity for trade to pass through markets may – at least in some circumstances, especially 
likely to be found in agriculture - lead to inefficiencies, the negative consequences of which 
may be larger than the benefits created by increased trade. We shall see that such an outcome 
is particularly likely in the case of agricultural commodities, which should therefore be given 
a special treatment.  
 
We shall first describe the traditional general equilibrium model at the core of the “liberal” 
reasoning. We shall see that, even along this line of reasoning, difficulties arise with respect 
to employment flexibility, distributional effects and externalities. But such difficulties could 
probably be overcome by suitable policies.  
 
Thus, the heart of the “anti-liberal” argument is not there, but in the difficulty of maintaining 
market efficiency when equilibriums are dynamically unstable. This may explain why 
liberalizing “luxury” products is quite feasible (and desirable), while the same policies applied 
to basic inelastic commodities leads to failures and efficiency losses. We shall illustrate this 
                                                 
1 Any body having once tasted a glass of Hastings wine can measure how much preferable is it to drink Port!) 
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contention by a new “disequilibrium” model of the world economy, tailored on the same 
patterns and data as are the classical CGE World Bank and other institutions models which 
have been used to “sell” liberalisation to decision makers, but slightly modified in order to 
incorporate the above considerations. Before tackling the heart of the matter, let us begin by 
an historical sketch of the controversy.  
 
I - Historical sketch of theory and practice 
 
he Ricardian parabola of wine and cloth is extremely powerful in the justification of 
trade, showing that, as soon as production conditions are different in two or more 
economic entities, everybody can gain, and nobody can loose from trade. Yet, this model is 
too general, and, at the same time, too rough and simple to specify at which prices will 
exchange occur. 
  
Nowadays, rather than on Ricardo, the “main stream” theory of trade relies on the set of 
theorems known as “HOS” (standing for Hecksher - Ohlin – Samuelson, from author’s 
names). Here, the basic Ricardo intuition is cast into a maximising device (the original article 
by Samuelson was based on “linear programming”), with price transmitting information 
between producers and consumers. As a consequence :  
 
a) a (hopefully unique) market equilibrium arises, showing how are prices 
affected by trade. Moreover, trade does not occur only because of natural 
advantages.  
b) Differences in factor endowment do matter as well, trade standing as a 
substitute to factors mobility. Therefore, trade expansion should ultimately 
end with all countries being “homothetic”, each with the same ratio 
land/labour/capital (and any other factor…), and each with about the same 
price system. Although growth should “naturally” achieve this outcome by 
the virtue of the “turnpike theorem”, provided the same technology be 
available everywhere, trade considerably accelerate the convergence 
process. This is the contribution of trade to growth.  
c) Finally, because trade changes prices, it also changes income distribution, 
with a very important consequence: even if trade globally improve welfare 
(by expanding the production possibility set, as demonstrated by Ricardo) it 
may also hurt some segments of the population, by decreasing the price of 
certain factors in certain countries (hence, the incomes of the owners), by 
comparison with what it could be without trade. This is the famous 
“Samuelson Stopler theorem”, which implies that if trade is meant to create 
a full “win-win” situation, compensations should occur between the “losers” 
and the “winners” (at the same time, such a compensation is surely feasible 
from a fraction only of the winners’ gains).   
 
All this should encourage decision makers to speed the path toward liberalisation. At the same 
time, the Samuelson-Stopler theorem provides a straightforward explanation of all resistances: 
of course, the vested interests of the few potential losers induce them to do all what they can 
to avoid losses, or, at least, to be overcompensated. Even more, potential “small” winners may 
be induced to disguise them into losers, in the hope of benefiting from (unjustified) 
compensations… Is it possible that such egoist strategies can prevent the whole world of 
benefiting from productivity and general welfare increase?  
T 
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To answer such a question, not only a qualitative, but a quantitative model is needed. Indeed, 
one should be able to determine the magnitude of the gains and losses, and how would it be 
possible for the winner to compensate the looser. Now, in its original form, the HOS model 
was not amenable to quantitative experiment. But it can be turned into a true “operational” 
model if one considers it is easily embedded into a general Walrassian general equilibrium 
model. Indeed, the original Walrassian is defined over a closed national economy, with 
various products, factors and consumers. But just consider two similar products (or factor, or 
consumer) in two different countries as distinct, and you can easily imagine a multi-country 
Walrassian model.  
 
The only difficulty, then, is in representing trade. But this is easily done by adorning the 
model with a process which defines good A consumed in country 1 as a suitable mix of good 
A produced domestically, and good A produced in country 2 (or 3, or 4..). Of course, 
transportation costs, and possible import taxes are taken into account at this stage. In this way, 
the world economy is easily pictured as a (very large) closed Walrassian model. Until 
recently, a very large Walrassian model was not numerically solvable. But thank to the 
progresses made during the last 50 years in electronic computing, the model size is not an 
obstacle any more, except perhaps for one important point, the dynamic aspect of the thing. 
We shall come back to this point later on.  
 
Another problem is with data availability. Setting up a Walrassian model requires input/out 
data, showing how much of good A is needed to produce good B, consumer behaviour data, 
showing how much of income consumer j spend on good A and good B, distributional data, 
showing the revenue share of factor i accruing to consumer j. It is now customary to make use 
of “Social Account Matrices” (a concept initiated at the World Bank by Pyatt and others), but 
such matrices are not available everywhere anytime. A pioneer work has been done in this 
respect by an Australian team under the name of ORANI (Dixon et al. 1980). Recently 
outstanding efforts have been made by Thomas Hertel at Purdue University for setting up a 
comprehensive world SAM called GTAP (Hertel et al. 1998).   
 
For the time being, let’s have a look at sample results, as displayed on  Table 1 (next page).  
It is clear from this table that estimations vary largely according to sources. This reflects 
various specifications and data sources for models: For instance, the “GTAP4” SAM was 
built on data for the year 1997, while “GTAP 5” is for 2001. The Carnegie and CEPII models 
contain several methodological innovations such as possible unemployment or increasing 
returns to scale. Moreover, the most recent of them do not start from the same origin: between 
1997 and 2001, many national economies have begun to reap the benefits of earlier decisions 
toward liberalisation, so that the benefits of a residual liberalisation cannot be the same as 
those of the disappearance of the barriers of the 70’s. Such improvements in models 
specification explain a definite tendency for benefits to shrink as time passes (Ackerman, 
2005)2 . But whatever their precise values, such benefits look huge when expressed in billion 
                                                 
2 in 1993, the World Bank published a study advertising benefits of more than 600 billion $ (It was sharply 
criticized by Nobel price winner Maurice Allais in a French daily newspaper, calling these results “an 
intellectual imposture” : cf Allais, 1993).   
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$. They are smaller if expressed in $/person or in % of GDP, varying from 30 to 0.5 $ per 
head, or from 3 to 0.5% of GDP: this is not much, but this is positive, after all.  
Table 1: Various models estimations of benefits from trade liberalisation in billion $  
 
Source Year of 
publication 
GDP gains 
for poor 
countries 
GDP gains 
for 
rich countries 
GDP 
gain for 
world 
GTAP 63 2005 22 62 84 
GTAP 4 2002 108 146 254 
LINKAGE 
20024 
2005 189 196 385 
LINKAGE5 2003 86 201 287 
Carnegie 
(Central 
Doha 
scenario) 6  
2006 30,1 28,5 58,6 
CEPII7 2005 274 62 337 
 
The question of the distribution of these benefits is more controversial: Of course, it is 
possible to describe how they are distributed between “rich” and “poor” countries. From this 
approach, although results may vary, there is a relatively wide consensus in favour of a “fifty-
fifty” distribution (but population is not distributed fifty-fifty: this means that the average 
benefit per person is much less for poor than for rich nation citizens). What is more worrying 
is that “within” may be more preoccupying than “between” country poverty. What happens if 
liberalisation favours the “rich” in each “poor” country 8 ?  
The problem here is not so much with theory rather than with data. There are no theoretical 
objections, instead of having only one representative household, to increase the number of 
household categories, for instance “rural rich”, rural poor”, urban rich”, “urban poor”9. But 
statistical bureaus rarely produce information on various household categories consumption 
levels, and they are even more reluctant to provide information regarding which household 
category owns which kind of resource. Thus, although it is clear that rich own the bulk of 
capital resources, while poor are endowed with the main part of labour, it is difficult to be 
more precise. Especially in agriculture, the determination of who own land (and rent) is 
difficult.  
                                                 
3 For GTAP 5 and GTAP6, see Ackermann (2005).  
4 Van Mensbrugghe, D. and J.C. Beghin (2005)   
5 Anderson, Martin and Van der Mensbrugghe (2005).  
6 Polaski, 2006 , table 3.1 
7 Bouet et al. (2004) 
8 For instance, Brazil is “poor” because there are many poor in Brazil. As a consequence, charity considerations 
would lead to allow help and preferential treatment to this poor country.  Now, when one see which kind of 
farmers would benefit of, say, Brazil sugar access to EC, one wonder whether poverty alleviation would not 
require allowing a special treatment to the “poor” European sugar farmers (who, yet, are not that poor!) 
9 For instance, Robillard (2000) , in a CGE model of Madagascar, defined more than 800 households, with data 
from an household consumption survey.  
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 Despite these difficulties, some studies tackle the problem directly, introducing “poor” and 
“rich” households into the models10 . Results are mixed “some countries experience a small 
poverty rise, and other more substantial poverty decrease… on balance, poverty is 
reduced…(but) complementary domestic reforms are required..” (Winter and Hertel, 2006).  
Indeed, even under the most favourable situations,  there does not seem to be any reason to 
think that the Doha round and other steps toward liberalisation have any chance to reduce 
poverty significantly. But it does not seem to increase it either. On the other hand, none of 
these models were designed in order to plan loser compensations from the winners benefits: 
curiously enough, the point is never tackled, even while if one takes welfare economics 
seriously, it should be at the core of the analysis. This induces to think that poverty 
considerations do not seem to be central in this context.  
Thus, as said by the US trade Representative Rob Portman in a comment of the Carnegie 
document: “The scenarios presented are consistent with a view that… economic gains grow as 
the degree of trade liberalization increases," 11 Thus, the more you liberalize, the better you 
are!  
The questions which arise at this stage are obviously “is this credible? Is this convincing? ”. 
There are two possible lines of answers. The first is to look at history: why is it that for 
several centuries, the benefits of liberalisation were known, and not made use of? Even more, 
why is it that in many times places, steps have been made toward liberalisation, eventually 
followed by steps in the opposite direction? The second is to look at the models themselves: 
do they contain flaws making them irrelevant or misleading?  
II -  A few historical reminders  
 
alidating such models – that is, assessing to what extent they reflect reality – is a hard 
task. The only possibility in this respect would be to run the model within a historically 
controlled setting, and check whether it behaves as was observed in reality. Unfortunately, 
such a test is not easy, especially with CGE’s, which by construction start from an observed 
SAM matrix, and forecast events which never occurred : since nobody tried to fully liberalize 
the world economy in 1998, the base year of GTAP 5,  it impossible to observe the prediction 
results for this year. Hertel et al. (2004) nevertheless provide some clues in this direction, but, 
whatever the merits of this important reference (which, at least, raises the question), the 
conclusions are not really convincing.  
 
Yet, another approach is feasible: looking back on the history of protectionism during the last 
two centuries. Of course, it will not provide a detailed assessment of CGE models. But since, 
during that time, even without models, liberal lobbies have been very active (and sometime 
successful), using arguments which are essentially the same as those implemented in models, 
it should be interesting to see whether they were confirmed by experience.  
 
Indeed, the first time liberalism became to be a political issue seems to have been in the 
1770’s in France. At that time, the French royal bureaucracy was protectionist and 
interventionist, prohibiting trade even within the country, on the ground that each province 
had to be self sufficient in grains, and that royal manufactures had to be protected against 
                                                 
10 For instance : Savard, 2005, Filho et al. 2005; Hertel and Winter, 2006 
11 Cf Office  of the US trade representative press release March 15th 2006 :  “Carnegie study reveals benefits 
increase with deeper trade liberalisation”.  
V 
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“unfair” practices (especially from England!). A debate - not unlike the contemporaneous 
controversies - ragged regarding the relevance of these regulations. The proponents of 
liberalism were called the “physiocrats” – meaning “those who wish to govern according to 
nature”. Ferdinand Galiani (1770) brought contradiction with a still topical message : 
liberalism is very good for manufactures, but very dangerous for agriculture. Galiani was 
poorly understood12. Various prime ministers from the declining monarchy launched 
liberalisation plans, most of them quickly abandoned in front of famine riots or other social 
unrest. The French revolution, which was all but liberal, ended the process. Notice England, at 
that time, was probably more liberal than France concerning domestic trade between 
provinces, but just as much protectionist regarding foreign trade, ruled by the “corn laws” 
passed by Cromwell.  
 
After the Napoleonic wars, in 1815, the question of foreign trade aroused again in France. The 
then in power land aristocracy was liberal: with relatively large farms, and good agronomists, 
most landowners considered they were in the position of “feeding Europe”. They preferred a 
liberal regime, which would allow them selling wheat in exchange of manufactured goods 
(mostly made in Britain). The “restauration” government was more prudent, and (from a 
Galiani’s idea) set up a “moving scale” tariff: external custom duties were raised in case of 
“good harvest” and lowered in “bad time”, thus keeping domestic prices fairly constant13.  
 
The liberal ideas made a come back in the 1840’s, and 50’s, as England, at the end, abolished 
the Corn Laws. The reason for that was double: first, in view of the demography, self 
sufficiency seemed out of question for England; second, the colonial era was opening, with 
the discovery “virgin lands”, while progresses in transportation techniques, for the first time, 
were giving sense to the Ricardian assumption of negligible transportation costs. France 
followed, as well as most European countries, while the nascent US power was ferociously 
protectionist, at least for manufactures14. In Germany, to Friedrich List’s despair15, the 
zollverein was moderately active, unable to promote German unity by its own virtue.  
 
In England, liberalism did not cause any harm (except perhaps to the agricultural sector), 
quite the contrary, no more than protectionism in the US. In France, the liberal period was 
short, because after 1870, Bismarck, the German prime Minister more or less imposed a mild 
protectionism to the whole Europe (except for England, and largely against it: the rational 
here, was a direct application of Friedrich List ideas concerning nascent industries. But 
contrary to List recommendations, agriculture was involved too, on the ground that Europe 
                                                 
12 He was rehabilitated by Joseph Schumpeter who devote him more than 10 pages (which is not a small honour) 
of the history of economic analysis ,, calling him “one of the ablest minds that ever became active in our field” 
(Schumpeter, 1954, P. 292).   .  
13 This system is not so different from the Thaï technique of paddy price stabilisation during the 60’s and the 
70’s – which enabled Thaïland  to develop the most efficient rice production system in the world. See Kajisa and 
Akayama (2003).   
 
14 Among other causes of the Civil War, the protection question was significant: the South was liberal, hoping 
exporting cotton. The North was protectionist, avoiding  “nascent industry” from Britain competition. The most 
notorious theorician of protectionism, Friedrich List, derived his book Das nationale System der politischen 
Ökonomie from his US experience (although born German, he was a US citizen).  
15 Notice List was protectionist for manufactures, not for agriculture. In his view, “cheap food” was necessary to 
lower wages, and making manufactures competitive. In this sense, he was in complete opposition with Galiani, 
and, indeed, much less clever.  
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had been on the eve of the famine16 several time since 1850, and that it was out of question 
leaving such events reproducing themselves).  
 
This situation lasted until the First World War. During the war itself, State intervention 
became the rule for all belligerents. It was followed by a liberal period of euphoria, which 
ended with the “great depression” of the 1930’s. The later was the point of departure of a new 
wave of protectionism and interventionism, which was reinforced by the second world war, 
and lasted until now (even if liberalism is fashionable since the 1980’s..). It must be stressed 
that, in Europe at least (it is probably also true elsewhere), the economy never growth more 
rapidly than between 1945 and 1975, precisely the time of the most prominent State activism 
in the history …(see figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1 :  
 
Per Capita GNP, Selected European Countries, 1900-2001
Sources: M addison, OECD, 2001  
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Notice that, despite the above mentioned divergence between Galiani and List on precisely 
that point, up till the 1930’s , protectionism,  at least at decision makers level, was envisaged 
globally, without making distinction between agriculture and other activities : for instance, 
when France decide to raise duties in the 1870’s, it is out of question to raise duties for 
manufactured goods only: agricultural commodities must follow, even if France, at the time,  
is a net food importer. The only exception is for tropical commodity, and even there, the true 
reason is that French imported tropical commodity comes from colonies, which are, in this 
respect at least, considered as parts of the “metropolis”.  
 
Now, this question is at the forefront of discussions in the aftermath of the great depression.  
The question was not only protectionism: Under the FD Roosevelt mandate, the question was 
                                                 
16 In 1856 (to be checked), the French governent was obliged to send steam powered battleship to tow away 
merchant sailing boats bringing wheat from Ukrain through the Gibraltar strait, in order to enable them reaching 
French harbours where famine was threatening.  
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indeed disconnecting agriculture from market. It was not a small decision: the first Farm bill 
was partially cancelled by the Supreme Court, and the proponents of the new course of 
agricultural policies were obliged to proceed by ruse. Among the many papers published at 
that time, one (Ezekiel, 1938) is of particular interest: Ezekiel gave the first clear exposition 
of the “cobweb theory”, explaining that “parameters do matter”. While a “luxury good” 
market is bound to converge toward equilibrium from whatever starting point, an “inferior 
good” market, with a low demand price elasticity, can “diverge”, and never reach equilibrium. 
This was a reason not to deal with agriculture in the same way as with luxury goods. 
Therefore, President Roosevelt was not a “socialist” in disconnecting agriculture from market, 
only a pragmatist.  
 
The “special treatment” of agriculture was an article of faith in the GATT, under J.M. 
Keynes’s intellectual inheritance. It was questioned only during the Uruguay Round, , in the 
1980’s, ending with the Marrakech treatise in 1993. And we are in a phase of liberalism since 
then. The question now is: will last for long? Probably, as for the preceding cases, this will 
depend upon the delay before the next general crisis. Up till now, there has not been any 
global catastrophe that the new liberalism could have been made responsible for, even if many 
“small catastrophes”, such as the East Asian crisis of 1998, did occurs. But this might occur. 
Models which do not assume producer’s “perfect information” provide clues in this direction. 
They are worth to be examined right now.  
 
III -  Alternative models  
 
Thus, we do not see the historical development of liberalism as a uniform motion from 
“backwardness” to “progress”. Rather, it can be interpreted as a succession of cycles, the 
merits of liberalism being clearly perceived during the protectionist periods, while periods of 
liberalism frequently end by economic collapsing, which justifies a movement back to 
protectionism and State intervention. In addition, the most perspicacious analysts seem to 
make a distinction between economic goods, recommending a different treatment for 
Agriculture (as well as other “low elasticity goods”) and other commodities. Is it possible to 
set up models explaining these characteristics?    
A- The Ezekiel (and followers) theoretical cobweb model  
 
The simple “cobweb” model by Ezekiel (1938) is a step in this direction17: as noticed above, it 
shows that “parameters do matter”, and that nothing (but suppressing the market) can prevent 
market failure, with prices and quantities falling below zero. The cobweb model, nevertheless, 
is insufficient, in that it does not explain why are “cycle” lasting. Indeed, it shows that while 
luxury goods markets are stable, just as a ball in the bottom of a cup, which comes back to the 
                                                 
17 Let qt and pt being quantity and price over a market, with :  
(1)  pt = α qt + β,     (demand curve, α and β are parameters) , and:  
(2)  $pt  = a qt + b   (supply curve , $pt  is expected price for year t, a and b , are parameters 
 (3)    $pt = pt-1  , (Naïve expectations)  
Then, if α/a < 1, it easy to show that the model “converges” toward equilibrium, where α qt + β,= a qt + b.  
But if α/a > 1, the model diverges, with prices and quantities growing to infinity in absolute value while 
alterning in sign. The solution is periodic in the (unlikely) case where α/a = 1 
 
Such a simple model is easily programmed onto a spreadsheet.  
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bottom when the cup has been shaken, low elasticity commodities are just as a ball at the 
sharp end of a pencil: even if it is formally in a static equilibrium, the later is unstable, and the 
ball falls down at the least motion of the pencil.   
 
What is needed, then, to explain cycles in the market historical development, is a “return 
spring”, something like the string of a cup-and-ball game, which prevents the ball completely 
falling. Such possible return springs are indeed easy to find. One could imagine that when 
prices fall too much, producers are short of money, and cannot replace decaying capital (early 
explanations of the “pork cycle” rely on such a mechanism, more credible than the 
straightforward cobweb, which assumes producers being so stupid as not imagining their 
interest is in counter-cycling production). More than one century ago, Wicksell (1905) 
invoked risk aversion, which Boussard (1996) formalized in a “risky cobweb” model18 (figure 
2), which shows a price series over 100 “years” as obtained from this model.  
 
Figure 2: example of a chaotic cobweb 
 
Source: Author’s computation, from equations listed on footnote 18 with indicated parameters 
 
Obviously, in such a case, price never equates marginal cost, meaning that either producer or 
consumer loose each “year”. Of course, each time the producer is the loser, the consumer is 
the winner, and vice versa. But as it is well known, losses are always greater than gains, so 
that, at the end, and over a long time, everybody is loosing at this game. This is a conspicuous 
                                                 
18 using the same notations as in footnote 17 above,  here we take:  
(3bis)                                                   $pt = = p°, constant.  
But since p is apparently random, with expected variance 2ˆtσ . instead of equating marginal cost with expected 
price, as in (2),the producer equates marginal cost with the price certainty equivalent, that is (according to the 
classical Von Neuman model) :  
(4)                                                         pct = $pt - A qt t$σ 2 , 
 where pct stands for the certainty equivalent of $pt , and A is an absolute risk aversion coefficient. Thus (2) 
becomes:  
(2bis)     pct = a qt + b    
Finaly, the model is closed by a naïve estimate of the expected variance (4):  
(5)   $σ t2  = ( pt - pt-1 )2 
q
t is determined by solving recursively equations (1), (2bis) , (4) and (5), from an arbitrary initial q0.On figure 2,   
 A=0.05, a=0.35, b=0, p°= 6, α = 0.6, β=10, x0 = 5; Αny other parameters would produce a quite different curve. 
Similar (but different) curves can be obtained from more complicated models, with capital decay, adaptative 
expectations, etc…  Again, this is easily programmed using a spreadsheet.  
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example of market failure, justifying state intervention (and, therefore, unavoidably,  
“distortions”).  
 
Yet, this theoretical exercise lacks the persuasive power of the CGE models described above. 
Would it be possible to incorporate the present analysis into a general equilibrium (one should 
rather say a general disequilibrium) model similar in spirit those which have been mentioned 
above, but slightly modified to take account of expectations and investment ? The CIRAD19’s 
ID3 model20 provides a partial answer to this question.  
 
Β − The CIRAD “ID3” model  
 
a) The standard CGE model  
 
Let us define the sets I for factors, J for commodities, H for institutions, t for time. Denote by: 
Fj (.) a production function., Uht (.)  the utility function of consumer h, and G(.) the investment 
function which transforms inputs into factors – mainly capital, but manpower as well.  
Call zhjt the final consumption of commodity j by consumer h ; xij the quantity of commodity 
or factor i used as input for commodity j ; vhjt the demand of commodity j by consumer h for 
investment, ehi, the quantity of factor I belonging to institution k ; πjt, the profit of industry j ; 
sht the savings by institution h, δhi a depreciation rate. Prices are denoted by pjt for commodity, 
πit for factors.  
 
The, reduced to skeleton, a standard recursive21 CGE can be described with the following 
equations:  
(1)  Fj (... xijt..) = ∑
h
zhjt + ∑
∈ JIi ,
xjit + ∑
h
vhjt ,   j∈J     (supply equates demand) 
(2)  φjt = pjt Fj (... xij..)  -  ∑
∈Ji  
pit xijt - ∑
∈Ii
πi t xijt, j∈J ;   (producer’s utility) 
(3)  ∑
j
xijt = ∑
h
ehit                    ∈∀i I       (factors availability) 
(4)  uht = U(...zhjt.., sht),                   h∈H ;     (consumer’s utility) 
(5)  ∑
j
pjt zhjt = ∑
∈Ii
eiht πit  + sht   h∈H      (consumer’s budget constraint) 
(6)          ∑
h
sht = ∑∑
jh
  pjt vhjt          h∈H    (savings) 
                                                 
19 CIRAD means « Center for international research in agriculture and development ». It is a French 
governmental institution devoted to agronomic research overseas.  
20 It has been the subject of many publications, among which Boussard, Gérard,et al (2006), Boussard, Gérard 
and Piketty (2005),  
21 “Recursive” here means that plans xtτ made at time t for time τ depend on observed past  values   xt-1. 
However, xtτ  may be eventually revised, in such a way that xt+1,1 may be different from xt,2 . Thus, in this 
framework, a model may be both recursive and multiperiodic, although the planning horizon is only one period 
ahead in all applications below.  
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(7)   ehit = ehit-1(1 - δhi) + G(..vhjt… )         h∈H, i∈I  (recurrence equation) 
 
The model is solved by writing the first-order conditions for producer’s and consumer’s 
optima, that are the derivatives with respect to xijt  of equation (2) subject to (3), and the 
derivatives with respect to zhjt and sht of equation (4) subject to (5). It is to be noticed that 
the only intertemporal equation is (7), which generalises the basic equation of capital 
dynamics. The standard version of the model is derived from these equations. In the 
imperfect information version, the following modifications have been included:  
 
b) A first modification to the standard model : a lag between production and 
consumption 
 
First,  a lag is introduced between the production and the consumption decisions for 
agricultural products. Equation (1) must be rewritten as:  
(1bis)                              Fj (... xijt-1..) = ∑
h
zhjt + ∑
∈ JIi ,
xjit-1 + ∑
h
vhjt ,   j∈J   
Thus, the market equilibrium occurs by the confrontation of last year (given) production, 
and current consumption. This means that production decisions cannot be taken on the 
basis of equilibrium prices. Rather, expected prices jtpˆ  must be used. Hence equation  (2) 
is modified into :  
(2bis)    φjt = jtpˆ  Fj (... xij..)  -  ∑
∈Ji  
pit xijt - ∑
∈Ii
πit xijt j ∈∀i J ;   
In addition, an expectation function Em(.) must be defined to determine jtpˆ  .  
We chose a Nerlovian adaptative expectations scheme22:     
      jtpˆ  = jtpˆ -1+ 0.05*( pjt - jtpˆ -1) 
 
Notice that actual equilibrium prices are used for inputs, so that expectations are important 
only for next year output. At the same time, since incomes are distributed immediately, 
incomes for year t depend heavily on expectations for year t+1,  which implies that firms 
may suffer losses or profit gains. They hence bear risk: this is the last and most important 
aspect of the model. In fact, risk plays a key role in two different ways: in the producer’s 
utility function (2bis), and in the recurrence equation (7). 
 
c) A second modification to the standard model: introducing risk in production 
decision 
 
                                                 
22 The coefficient of revision is very low. However, It may be justify as an approximation for rational 
expectations in a highly fluctuating environment. In the absence of sufficient information, rational actors may 
indeed decide to keep their expectations nearly constant, at the initial cost level, for example. 
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 In the producer’s utility function, some sort of/a risk premium is introduced. Although 
there are many possibilities in this respect, the simplest Markowitz utility function was 
opted for. Thus, (2ter) replaces (2bis):   
(2ter)    φjt = jtpˆ  Fj (... xij..)  -  ∑
∈Ji  
pit xijt - ∑
∈Ii
πit xijt - 2Ajt 2ˆ jtσ F2jt(... xij..)   
where 2ˆ jtσ  is the expected variance of pjt, and Ajt some/a risk aversion coefficient.  
Of course, this implies the expectation function Ev(.) to be defined for variance. With naïve 
expectations, Em,, it seems logical to take 2ˆ jtσ = ( 1-jtpˆ  - pjt)2, although more complicated 
expectation schemes could be envisaged. The order of magnitude of Ajt (the absolute risk 
aversion coefficient) is important. It should be commensurable with 1/w, where w is the 
average wealth of the decision-maker. This remark opens the way for introducing wealth 
and wealth distribution (in addition to income) considerations into CGE’s – and this not the 
least interest of this approach.   
 
Finally, the last term of equation (2ter), 2Ajt 2ˆ jtσ F2jt(... xij..), is an expected profit. It should 
be distributed one way or another. We decide to distribute it just as the income from 
capital, on the (fragile23) ground that profit is the reward for taking risk, and that profit 
accrue in general to capital holders.   
 
d) A third modification to the standard model: the recursive equation  
 
 In most standard CGE’s, the function G, which, in equation (7)  specifies how the year 
factor endowment is derived from the year t-1 solution, is straightforward:  changes in total 
labor force is driven by demography, while capital is easily shifted from one sector to 
another, so that it is “rationally” invested in the most productive places. Yet, such 
assumptions imply that a nuclear power plant can be used to harvest grain, or that a bus 
driver can be employed immediately as a teacher in mathematics. It is not very realistic. 
Other more realistic models have been set up with sector-specific labor force and capital. 
The difficulty of specifying the “recursive” relations between factor endowments of two 
successive years then become apparent.  
In the present model, although it might be poorly realistic, no special care has been taken 
for labor: it shifts freely within groups of sectors (agriculture, manufactures, etc..). By 
contrast, an original submodel has been developed for capital.  
The old capital is fixed by sector, just decaying at a constant rate. But the “new” capital 
owned by each institution is allocated between sectors according to a Markowitz(1970) 
mean/variance portfolio selection model. With :  
kjt         :  capital of branch j, time t 
 St         : total saving period t 
jtπˆ      : expected profitability of capital in branch j 
                                                 
23 Without quoting the whole enormous literature pertaining to distribution theory and the sociology of labor, it 
is well known that workers may benefit from the profits of a successful firm, especially if the latter enjoys some 
monopoly power, and even if this kind of advantage is vanishing nowadays under the pressure of competition.  
 14 
)(ˆ jtV π : expected variance of jtπ  
Ak          : risk aversion parameter for institution k 
Pkjt : price of the capital good for branch j 
jtkPˆ       : expected value of Pkjt 
Ijt             : capital good bought for branch j, time t 
 
 Ijt is chosen by investors through the maximization of : 
(8)     kjtjt
j
jt AIPk −∑πˆ )(ˆ jtV π Ijt2   
subject to : 
(9)     tjtjt
j
SIPk ≤∑  
with a naïve expectation scheme : 
(10)    jtπˆ = 1−jtπ  
(11)     kjtPˆ = Pkjt-1 
(12)     )(ˆ jtV π = 221 )ˆˆ( −− − jtjt ππ  
Then, the capital available for each branch j is updated in the recursive loop over time: 
(13)    kjt+1= kjt (1-δj) + Ijt  , where δj is capital depreciation rate. 
 
In this way, the two mechanisms likely to constitute the above described “return spring” 
leading an unstable market to chaos (risk and capital accumulation, as noticed above) are 
represented in the ID3 model. Notice that, although exchange rate variability has not been 
taken into account, such a model could be extended to cope with this important source of 
volatility.  
 
e) Results  
 
The Gtap data base (version 5) has been used to represent the world through 13 regions, 5 
production factors  and 17 sectors, including 8 for agricultural production and 4 for agri-
business. Two types of households are considered, splitting the population around the 
income median, and defining middle-low income and middle-high income group, in order 
to be able to include equity considerations when analyzing the results.  
Production is described by embedded CES production functions. At the first level, 
aggregate added value and aggregate variable inputs are considered. These are 
disaggregated at the second level, where two other CES are used, one for the five 
production factor and another for inputs. Parameters are taken from the GTAP data base24.  
Demand is a linear expenditure system, estimated by using GTAP income elasticities as 
well as consumption and price levels.  
Exchange rates are exogenous. Investment is determined by savings and foreign capital 
flows, calculated to balance the external trade. Government budget is balanced through 
public consumption adjustment. The two versions of the model are dynamic, using 
                                                 
24 Detailed equations of the model can be found in Boussard  et al. (2002).  
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temporary equilibriums. Because of uncertainty on agricultural prices, the expected 
profitability of agricultural activity, which determines resources allocation to the various 
agricultural activities, may differ from the real ones, calculated one year later. Therefore, at 
least one production factor has returns distributed with the same lag, so as to allow the 
adjustment between expected and real results. Capital returns are calculated ex-post, in 
order to allow this adjustment. 
Armington assumption of imperfect substitutes of products from different countries holds. 
Parameters as well as transport costs are taken from the GTAP data base.  Although 
exchange rate variability has not been taken into account, such a model could be extended 
to cope with this important source of volatility.  
 
With such modifications, the results of a “total liberalisation experiment” are quite different 
from what they are with a standard model. Figure 2 shows the present values of benefits for 
poor and rich25 at a 10% discount rate, under the two hypothesis “standard model26”, and “ID3 
model  
Figure 2  
Household utilities : difference "With" - "Without" liberalisation
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While the differences between “with” and “without” liberalisation are fairly small in the case 
of the “standard” model, they are very significant with the ID3 model. In addition, while the 
                                                 
25 These are not GNP, but the values of household utility functions. The later are standard LES’s, with 
“committed consumptions” (especially for what concerns food products) and constant shares of products in 
.budgets over committed consumptions. Thus, utilities do not sum up to GNP, but to GNP less committed 
consumptions.  At the same time, passing through utility functions is necessary if one wants looking at welfare 
of population segments (such as “rich” and “poor”) 
26 Actually, the standard model here is not completely standard, since the « Markowitz sub model » described 
above (for allocating new capital between sectors) is still in action. Only the producer expectation and  risk 
aversion submodels  have been removed. Yet, in the absence of the volatility engendered by expectation errors, 
the Markowitz submodel plays a negligible role in results.  
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standard model suggest that modest gains are distributed across regions, only one region, 
Europe, gains with ID3.  
 
This last result is probably an artefact of the model: it is a consequence of the definition of the 
“reference” scenario, the “business as usual” assumption. In 1998, the reference year, EC 
rules were guaranteeing a low protection rate, especially for grains, while keeping a constant 
(medium) domestic price. As a consequence, in this reference situation, each time the world 
prices of grains were below the EC guaranteed domestic price, the EC was obliged to stock 
the excess  world excess supply, at the cost one can imagine. The liberalisation frees the EC 
from the burden of stabilizing the world price, thus creating a large welfare increase in this 
region.  
 
Yet, such a scenario is not very plausible: obviously, as soon as the EC authorities will be 
aware of the problem, they would redraft policy rules in order to avoid such a costly duty. Of 
course, this is not taken in account in the model. The model has also been run with this rule 
removed: in this case, it is simply impossible to get more than 10-20 years solutions, because, 
after this time, the system locks itself into a “no solution” situation. This does not mean that 
the model is “false” or inconsistent. Actually, nobody has ever seen a policy lasting for 20 
years without change. And the reason for changing is precisely the awareness of going toward 
some inextricable situation. It is therefore not surprising that the ID3 gets such an outcome.  
 
The deep reason for this outcome is the volatility of prices, and, therefore, of benefits, in the 
“liberal” situation. Figures  3 and 4 illustrate this statement.  
 
Rich households utility - standard model 
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
1 11 21
Time
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fr
om
 re
fe
re
nc
e 
 
ROW
East
Europe
Md-East
North Af. 
S.Sah.
Africa
UE
USA
Mercosur
Lat. Am. 
Austr-NZ
ASIA-Dev
ASIA SE
ASIE
South
CHINA  
 a: standard 
 
 
Rich households utility, ID3
-60
-30
0
30
60
1 11 21
Time 
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fr
om
 re
fe
re
nc
e 
ROW
East Europe
Md-East
North Af. 
S.Sah.
Africa
UE
USA
Mercosur
Lat. Am. 
Austr-NZ
ASIA-Dev
ASIA SE
ASIE South
CHINA
 
b: ID3  
 
Figure 3 : Time path of benefit from liberalisation for rich households in various regions 
with the standard model and with ID3 
 
Figure 3 shows the time path of the benefits from liberalisation, in % deviation from 
reference, in the case of the rich households (we could have drawn a similar graph for the 
poor) as determined by ID3and by the standard model : one can easily see that the scales are 
not the same, deviations from reference varying around ±-5% in  the case of the standard 
model, and ±60% in the case of ID3. Indeed the volatility of benefits in this case  is extreme, 
and certainly unbearable for those being in the worse situation (which is the case of almost 
every region, at an time or another). Such results can explain the people reluctance to 
liberalisation…  
 
The volatility of benefits itself is a consequence of the volatility of prices, as shown on figure 
4 for “other cereals” (that is, all cereals but wheat and rice), in the case of the Mercosur. 
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Clearly, prices are much more volatile in ID3 than in “standard” simulations: They vary 
between 0.5 and 3 with ID3 while staying between 1 and 1.5 with the “standard model”. At 
the same time, one sees also on this graph that liberalisation does not increase the volatility 
significantly. This is because the Mercosur agricultural prices are not very protected in the 
reference situation, where they are already submitted to a more or less chaotic regime.   
 
 
Figure 4  
"Other cereals" prices in Mercosur with four model 
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Figure 5 gives the current evolution of the price of maïze in Argentina : although there exist 
obvious difference between this real life series and the series generated by ID3, the latter 
resemble more to reality than those generated by the “standard” model.  
 
Figure 5  
Current maïze price in Argentina (1991-2002)
Source : FAO  
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Of course, more general and systematic tests of ID3 ability to reproduce the general pattern of 
agricultural price and production series have been attempted, with in general the same sort of 
conclusion: it is impossible to say that the ID3 generated series are identical with actual ones, 
but in any case, they are “more similar” to actual than those generated by the standard model.  
It is therefore possible to consider the ID3 model results with some confidence, and assert that 
the consequences of liberalisation, if they can generate “benefits” at the end, are also capable 
of generating an enormous instability, perhaps ending with tragic deadlocks. This instability 
will alternatively harm various segments of population  - not the same all the time, but deep 
enough for that those having the least political influence, when their turn come to be hurt, be 
very reluctant to continue the experience. Thus, without mechanisms carefully designed for 
the winner to compensate the loser, it is extremely likely that social unrest and political 
instability prevent the experience lasting long enough for that everybody could reap the 
benefits. As we have seen, this is exactly what happened several times during the two last 
centuries.  
IV-Returning to reality 
 
Is possible to interpret real life history in the light of the above consideration? Obviously, this 
is a hard task, that will not be feasible into a short paper as the present one. Yet, some clues 
can be provided.  
 
First, let us look at the long term history of US wheat prices (figure 6). It is easy to observe a 
break in this series, in the 1935’s. It is detected by the now standard method for detecting 
break points (Bai and Perron, 1998, 2003). Before that date, the series is highly fluctuating, 
but practically stationary ( there is a slight increasing trend from 1840 to 1900, and a slight 
tendency to decline between 1900 and 1930, but it is mild, and no break points are detected 
around 1900).  
 
Figure 6 
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On the other hand, a break point is clearly detected in 1934 – the beginning of the Roosevelt’s 
policy of disconnecting agriculture from market. Since that time, the price volatility is 
considerably reduced. The trend is increasing until 1946, because of the second world war. It 
is clearly decreasing after, and continues to decrease nowadays27.  
The main conclusion to be derived from this graph is that, contrary to the “farm problem” 
school allegations (Gardner, 1992), the agricultural US policy has not been at the consumer or 
taxpayer detriment. More precisely, although it has had a cost to the taxpayer, this cost has 
been recovered and beyond by the consumer. The reason is that this policy allowed for a 
fantastic upsurge of technical progress, and not only in the US, but almost everywhere in the 
world, as illustrated figure 7 regarding the US and France. It is especially interesting to notice 
that the break in the yield series occurs in 1935 in the US, and only in 1947 in France, when 
the Roosevelt’s style policy begun to be effectively applied in this country.  
 
Figure 7  
Wheat yields, in USA and France, 1866-2001
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Of course, it could be said that this progress would have been even greater within a purely 
liberal setting. One may have doubts in this respect, if one considers that most of the 
techniques applied in the 30’s and the 40’s existed for long before. What happened at this 
moment is that, freed from price volatility, farmers could take credit for heavy investments. In 
that way, they substituted capital to labour, freeing labour for other sectors growth, and 
engaging their country into a virtuous development cycle.  
CONCLUSION  
 
The main lesson is that, if trade is always “good”, the necessity for it to pass through market 
is not always a blessing. If market does not work efficiently, with long run marginal cost 
never equating long run price, there are possibilities that the “liberal” situation be worse than 
the second best “policy driven” situation. Such a situation is likely to occur in the case of low 
demand elasticity, especially agricultural, commodities28. In such a case, of course, trade must 
                                                 
27 Surprisingly, the price upsurge of 1972-74 does not appear to be remarkable in the Bai and Perron logic. It is 
treated as an outlier.  
 
28 Indeed, other commodities, such as petrol, are in exactly the same situation. But petrol is  managed by a cartel 
which have been operating efficiently during the last few decennia , even if the events of the last few months 
may induce some  to think it is now out of control.   
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not be ruled out. But it should be “regulated” in order to avoid unjustified price surges or 
declines. Now, since price regulation is not possible without restrictions to trade, such 
restrictions should be allowed.  
 
On the other hand, whenever, because of high demand elasticity, markets can “converge” 
toward equilibrium, everything going toward a more liberal situation is desirable. This is 
exactly what Galiani used to say 250 years ago. This was also the message conveyed by 
Ezekiel, and which led to the present “modern” agricultural policies (even if most liberal 
economists would probably deny the word “modern”, and reserve it to liberal policies which, 
in my view, are typically old fashioned). The present situation of the economic profession, 
which, in its vast majority, unconditionally supports blind liberalism, is the more surprising as 
all contrary arguments have been exposed and discussed for years.  
 
Why, then, such a situation? A reason  is probably because most modern economists are 
reasoning in terms of comparative static, while problems are essentially dynamic. Indeed, 
dynamics it the Achill’s heal of computable general equilibrium models. In principle, as 
suggested especially by Arrow, there is no objection in considering a particular commodity at 
two different times as two distinct commodities (and the same for consumers and factors). 
This will just expand the model size, up to a point which quickly becomes unbearable, even 
with modern computers. On the other hand, a model designed in this way will be perfectly 
consistent with all the information available at a particular time, especially with regard to 
savings and investment. It can incorporate considerations of risk, especially if insurance 
markets are complete (and if risk is not endogenously generated, as we shall see below). It 
will  describe the flows of trade over centuries : this is rather appealing !  
 
 But here is the problem: how can we have any confidence in a prediction of trade flows over 
20 years, when it is so obvious that so many events can occur within this time span? Are 
complete insurance markets actually existing?  Do the above mentioned advantages 
compensate for the increased computation and data maintenance burden?  Because the 
answers to these questions are so obviously negative,  I very much doubt that comparative 
static can be of any help in designing a development policy either at the national or at the 
world level. The problem of development is essentially a problem of (physical) capital 
accumulation: who could imagine treating such a problem from a purely static device, which 
ignores risk, miscalculations, credit and reimbursement, over and underproductions, and all 
these things which are the core of economic life ?   
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